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Abstract
We show that several interpretations of quantum mechanics admit an ontology of objects and
events. This ontology reduces the breach between mind and matter. When humans act, their
actions do not appear explainable in mechanical terms but through mental activity: motives,
desires or needs that propel them to action. These are examples of what in the last few decades
have come to be called “downward causation”. Basically, downward causation is present when the
disposition of the whole to behave in a certain way cannot be predicted from the dispositions of
the parts. The event ontology of quantum mechanics allow us to show that systems in entangled
states present emergent new properties and downward causation.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DERIVATION OF AN ONTOLOGY FROM PHYSICS
Classical physics has inspired an ontology that that has had profound implications in the
origins of modern philosophy. In this ontology one assumes certain robust associations of
properties and objects. These associations have certain stability with respect to time and
are independent of the specific sequence of observations. For instance sufficiently frequent
measurements of the position of a particle give similar values and if one decides to mea-
sure other attributes between two measurements of positions the result remain unchanged.
These hypotheses, valid in any classical ontology, led to Hume’s conception of the world, so
ingrained in contemporary philosophy. We will return to them later on.
To derive an ontology from the quantum theory has not been easy given its interpreta-
tional difficulties together with its conflict with the classical ideas. In spite of initial efforts
by the leading founders of the field, dealing with the problem with an operational approach,
questions have lingered. Within the Copenhagen Interpretation quantum mechanics is in-
troduced in terms of measurements. Quantum systems do not have definite properties till
they are measured. Between measurements their evolution is deterministic, as described
by Schro¨dinger’s equation, but in the measurements one has probabilistic behavior. In the
standard presentation, one also has to assume that in the measurement processes the states
change in a way not described by the Schro¨dinger equation. The difficulties to associate
attributes to a quantum system independent of it being measured or not are in the core of
the ontological problems presented by the quantum theory.
Perhaps the common characteristic between the different proponents of the Copenhagen
Interpretation is precisely that facing certain ontological problems they retreat and stop
any attempt to analyze the situation in fully realistic terms. As we have seen, this point
of view appears very problematic to all those like Einstein, Schro¨dinger or Bell, who refuse
to take instrumentalist positions. The acceptance without criticism of the Copenhagen
Interpretation in its various versions has not favored the development of new ideas and
questions and delayed the understanding of the most revolutionary aspects of quantum
physics. It was only due to the immense intellectual stature of certain dissenters, as the ones
we just mentioned, that these problems remained in the spotlight and allowed advances as
those of Bell and the subsequent discovery of quantum decoherence. In the last decades this
situation has changed because the investigation of topics of great conceptual importance,
2
like those having to do with entanglement and decoherence, have opened new perspectives
with remarkable potential practical applications like quantum cryptography or quantum
computation. The advances have allowed to verify that many macroscopic systems have
quantum behavior and the conviction that the quantum theory has universal validity has
been reinforced. It has also become apparent that the different physical aspects related to
the measurement problem like the interaction with the environment or the use of physical
clocks are perfectly analyzable with the methods of quantum mechanics and should not be
excluded at the time of seeking a more complete understanding of the problem.
A. The ontology of classical physics
For centuries the principles of classical mechanics as formulated by Newton and devel-
oped by Lagrange and Laplace were implicitly considered as the basis and foundation of the
scientific conception of the Universe. The expectation was that the other sciences would
eventually be reduced and explained in mechanical terms. Even though this goal was never
achieved many areas of knowledge adopted a general mechanistic world-view. The mechanis-
tic paradigm was superseded by relativity and quantum mechanics but it has been extremely
prevalent until our days because of its simplicity and apparent consistency. The mechanis-
tic paradigm is simple: matter is composed by elementary components —particles— which
are not altered when they combine to give rise to complex structures. Classical mechanics
identifies the world as a succession of instantaneous configurations of systems of material
points that occupy successive positions in the mathematical space of Euclidean geometry.
In this context, different phenomena produced by a system result from the different
configurations that its component particles take. Given the laws of force, the motion obeys a
deterministic evolution. Nothing new may occur in a classical system that is not determined
by its initial configuration. In the classical world there is causal closure, every event is
the consequence of preceding events without any freedom for novelty. The elements of the
classical world are matter, the absolute space and time in which that matter moves, and
the laws of force that govern movement. No other independent categories of being, such as
mind, feelings or purpose are acknowledged. Cartesian dualism includes the mental aspects
in terms of a new substance, being any possibility of interaction between the mental and
the physical basically impossible to explain without ad hoc assumptions.
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The discovery of an independent form of matter as the classical fields —for instance the
electromagnetic one— did not change the basic foundations of the classical ontology. In
particular classical fields have well defined attributes that can be measured at any time and
the theory still is determinist. The notion of separability that is at the basis of Hume’s
doctrine of supervenience [1] is still perfectly justified within the context of classical physics
including fields. It establishes that “The complete physical state is determined by (super-
venes on) the intrinsic physical state of each space-time point (or each point like object) and
the spatio-temporal relations between this points.” In other words separability establishes
that the total state of the Universe is determined by the states of its localized parts. As it
was noticed by Teller [2] and stressed by Maudlin [1] this notion of separability no longer
applies at the quantum mechanical level.
B. Quantum mechanics and the crisis in the ontology of classical physics
In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, the wave function is a representa-
tion of all our probabilistic knowledge about outcomes of possible measurements and as such
is devoid of any ontological content: As Busch [3] puts it: “In other words in the standard
interpretation, the formalism of quantum mechanics or the quantum algorithm does not
reflect a well defined underlying reality, but rather it constitutes only knowledge about the
statistics of observed results.”
The classical concepts are put in doubt by this interpretation but are not substituted
by better, more suitable concepts. Faye, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [4]
summarizes Bohr’s point of view as follows:
• “The interpretation of a physical theory has to rely on an experimental practice.
• The experimental practice presupposes a certain pre-scientific practice of description,
which establishes the norm for experimental measurement apparatus, and consequently
what counts as scientific experience. . . .
• This pre-scientific experience is grasped in terms of common categories like thing’s
position and change of position, duration and change of duration, and the relation of
cause and effect, terms and principles that are now parts of our common language.
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• These common categories yield the preconditions for objective knowledge, and any
description of nature has to use these concepts to be objective.
• The concepts of classical physics are merely exact specifications of the above categories.
• The classical concepts... are therefore necessary in any description of the physical
experience in order to understand what we are doing and to be able to communicate
our results to others, in particular in the description of quantum phenomena as they
present themselves in experiments; ...”
But the consistency of the classical description is in this context in doubt because the
line of separation between the quantum object and the measuring device is not the one
between macroscopic instruments and microscopic objects. In fact, as Bohr himself pointed
out, parts of the measuring device need sometimes to be treated in quantum mechanical
terms in order to have a consistent description of the measurement processes.
II. AN ONTOLOGY OF STATES, OBJECTS AND EVENTS FOR QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Attempts to base an ontology on events have a long history that was reinforced by
relativity and the quantum theory. In relativistic physics events are considered points in
space-time. The events of the relativistic universe combine into partially ordered sets. An
event B is to the future of another event A if it belongs to its future region defined by the
light cone with vertex in A. In that case A can influence B. If B is outside the future light
cone of A then it is causally disconnected with A since the maximum speed of propagation
of a signal is the speed of light. The formalism of quantum mechanics makes reference
to primitive concepts like system, state, events and the properties that characterize them.
The use of these concepts suggests that the theory should admit an ontology of objects
(understood as systems in given states) and events. The program of accounting for physical
reality in terms of events has a long and noble tradition that goes back to Russell, who
stated that [5] “the enduring thing or object of common sense and the old physics must be
interpreted as a world-line, a causally related sequence of events, and ... it is events and not
substances that we perceive.” To put it differently, for Russell and object is nothing more
than a set of events that are causally connected. Although we consider this point of view
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a step in the right direction, we think it is incomplete for a foundation of physical reality
based on events, particularly in the light of quantum mechanics.
A quantum system is described by a Hilbert space that represents the set of its possible
states and the events that may occur in the system. Based on this ontology, objects and
events can be considered the building blocks of reality. Objects will be represented in the
quantum formalism by systems in certain states. In an event interpretation like the ones we
are considering, events are the actual entities while states represent potentialities to produce
events.
The basic idea of a measurement is the occurrence of a macroscopic phenomenon, that
is of something capable of reaching perception. Thus, as noticed by Omne`s, the measure-
ment of a property of a microscopic object implies making it generate a phenomenon, in
other terms produce an event. The process of detection of photons by dissociation of silver
bromide in a photographic plate leading to a cascade effect that produces the accumulation
of millions of atoms of silver is an example of the production of an event. The appearance
of a dot in the photographic plate is an example of a macroscopic event that constitutes
the world accessible to our senses [6]. The dot and its properties have, like any property,
a mathematical counterpart in the formalism of quantum mechanics corresponding to pro-
jectors in the Hilbert space of the detecting plate. We are thinking in this kind of events
as the building blocks of the apparent reality. Both the event —the appearance of a dot—
and its properties are characterized by projectors [7]. We shall call essential property the
projector that completely characterizes the event and denote it by PE that is a projector
on the Hilbert space of the photographic plate. Let us call P1, ...Pn the projectors in the
Hilbert space of the plate that characterize the properties of the dot. As we have shown in
[7] the properties of an event satisfy PiPE = PE .
States describe the potentialities or dispositions of the systems for the production of
certain events. The formalism of quantum mechanics associates a projector to each property
or event. The element hydrogen is a quantum system. A particular atom is a system in a
given state. It is an example of what we call object. It is characterized by its disposition
to produce events on other systems: for instance the emission of a photon that produce a
click in a photodetector. Note that for Russell an atom cannot be considered an object as
long as it does not interact yielding events, whereas our definition naturally includes any
microscopic object as an object given that its disposition to produce events is always defined
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by its state.
Concrete reality accessible to our senses is constituted by events localized in space-time.
That is, by certain entities that occupy a small region of space-time. As Whitehead [8] rec-
ognized: “the event is the ultimate unit of natural occurrence.” Events come with associated
properties. Quantum mechanics provides probabilities for the occurrence of events and their
properties. When an event happens, like in the case of the dot on a photographic plate in
the double slit experiment, typically many properties are actualized. For instance, the dot
may be darker on one side than the other, or may have one of many possible shapes. The
postulated association between properties and objects typical of the classical physics is now
substituted by an association of properties with events. Objects understood as systems in
certain dispositional state do not have properties until their are measured or produce events
There is only an exemption to this rule. One can in principle assign some properties to
pure states. These properties are the ones observed during the preparation of the state. But,
contrary to what happens in classical physics these associations are not independent of the
specific sequence of observations performed on the quantum system. Thus one of the main
postulates of classical ontologies as Hume’s one is no longer valid. This assumption, that was
considered by Einstein at the root of the possibility of doing science1 and the derived notion
of separability we mentioned before do not apply to quantum physics that nevertheless is a
rigorously formulated and tested theory.
When one considers non-local systems like particles in entangled states, whose compo-
nents occupy different positions in space-time it is not possible to speak of a state at a given
time, since that is a notion that depends on the Lorentz reference frame chosen. However,
if the state is defined by its disposition to produce events one can rigorously show [9] that
such disposition is uniquely defined and the state in the Heisenberg picture only changes
1 in one of the letters to Max Born Einstein says: “the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world,
that is, ideas are established relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim a ’real existence’
that is independent of the perceiving subject. ... It is further characteristic of these physical objects that
they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this arrangement of
things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another,
provided these objects ’are situated in different parts of space’. Unless one makes this kind of assumption
about the independence of the existence (the ’being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another
in space which stems in the first place from everyday thinking - physical thinking in the familiar sense
would not be possible.”
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when events take place. The disposition to produce events separated spatially in the sense
of relativity, that is not causally connected, is independent of the temporal order that one
assigns to such events. In fact, the assigned order is purely conventional since it depends on
the reference system used. The concept of states in quantum systems is necessarily holistic
in space-time [1]. Very far removed from the notion of separability that Einstein considered
mandatory in order to do science.
The event ontology we have presented has the attractive feature of reducing the breach
that exists between the material and mental worlds. As Russell [10] pointed out “if we can
construct a theory for the physical world which makes its events continuous to perception,
we have improved the metaphysical status of physics”. According to his view we need “an
interpretation of physics which gives a due place to perceptions”. The ontology of events we
are proposing could provide this interpretation: events in the external world are subject to
a physical description while at least some events in our brain could be directly accessible as
perceptions. Both mental events and physical events would admit the same mathematical
description in terms of projectors in a Hilbert space. The main difference between both
forms of events is the way we access to them: a first person access for the mental and third
person access for the physical As noted by David Chalmers [11]: “The distinguishing mark of
the first-person view is the air of mystery which surrounds it. This feeling of mysteriousness
has led many people to dismiss the first-person out of hand. ... But the first-person is
not to be dismissed so easily. It is indeed a glaring anomaly today, in the heyday of the
scientific world-view. If it was not for the direct experience which all of us have of the
first-person, it would seem a ridiculous concept. But it throws up too many problems to be
neatly packaged away in the kind of third-person explanation which suffices for everything
else in the scientific world. Pity.”
Each primitive concept that is introduced in the axioms of quantum mechanics is associ-
ated with a mathematical concept well known in ordinary quantum mechanics, but one can
only assign them a well defined philosophical meaning if one has an interpretation of the
theory. For example, quantum mechanical events could not be used as the basis of a realis-
tic ontology without a general criterion for the production of events that is independent of
measurements. On the other hand, the concepts of state and system only acquire ontological
value when the events also have acquired it. It is important to remark that having a realist
interpretation of quantum mechanics not only allows us to understand the measurement
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process; it also allows understanding how a world with uniquely defined properties arises
from a quantum world of potentialities. Some of these interpretations will allow us to derive
an ontology where objects and events can be considered the building blocks of reality.
III. INTERPRETATIONS THAT ADMIT AN EVENT ONTOLOGY
In what follows we will discuss three interpretations that admit event ontologies. They are
the Many Worlds Interpretation, the Modal Interpretation and Montevideo Interpretation.
As we will see not all of them lead to the same notion of event. As a consequence the
corresponding ontologies will exhibit minor variations depending on what interpretation is
considered.
A. Events in the Many Worlds Interpretation
Everett [12] addressed the measurement problem assuming that the wavefunction de-
scribes the Universe as a whole, including the observers and that it evolves continuously
obeying the Schro¨dinger equation without any discontinuity or collapse.
In order to explain our observations he assumed that the wave function of an observer
would, in effect, bifurcate at each interaction of the observer with a superposed object. The
universal wave function would contain branches for every alternative result of the measuring
object. Each branch has its own copy of the observer, a copy that perceives one of those
alternatives as the outcome. Schro¨dinger evolution ensures that once formed, the branches
do not influence one another. Thus, each branch embarks on a different future, independently
of the others.
In order to understand how the branches corresponding to different measurement out-
comes become independent and each turn out looking classical one uses today the deco-
herence theory. For Everett, all elements of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual”,
“none any more real than the rest.” Summarizing: worlds “are mutually dynamically iso-
lated structures instantiated within the quantum state, which are structurally and dynam-
ically quasi-classical” [13]. The existence of possible different “worlds”, is established by
decoherence theory.
The ontology of the Many Worlds Interpretation may be considered as a monist perspec-
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tive where states and events have the same nature. One may consider that in this approach
what we call states and events are aspects of a fundamental entity which is the state of the
complete multiverse. Notice that the relevant kind of events in the Many Worlds Interpreta-
tion corresponds to events associated with observable phenomena that give rise to different
“mutually dynamically isolated structures instantiated within the quantum state”.
But one needs to assume that for certain superpositions —that according to decoherence
are very similar to statistical mixtures—, the different states that compose the statisti-
cal mixture acquire independent reality. The appearance of independent realities in the
branching process may be considered as the events. But strictly speaking one does not have
statistical mixtures but superpositions, and it is not clear how to assign any reality to these
superpositions, given the fact that different basis may be used to define them. It is not our
purpose to enter into a critical analysis of the interpretations, however we remark that the
ontology itself is problematic in the Many Worlds Interpretation.
B. Events in Modal Interpretations
Van Fraassen [14] proposed an alternative procedure to eliminate the projection postulate
from the quantum theory. His proposal relies on the distinction between “dynamical states”
and “value states” or “actual-valued” observables. The dynamical state is the usual state
of quantum mechanics: it determines which properties may the system have in its future
and their corresponding probabilities. The value state represents the physical properties
that the system actually has at a given instant. The Modal Interpretation in its different
versions assumes that physical systems at all times possess a number of well-defined physical
properties, these properties can be represented by the system’s value state. An essential
feature of this approach is therefore that a system may have a sharp value of an observable
even if the dynamical state is not an eigenstate of that observable. What changes in the
different versions of this interpretation is how the actual valued properties are defined.
In the Kochen–Dieks (K-D) [15] Modal Interpretation the biorthogonal (Schmidt) de-
composition of the pure quantum state of the system selects the actual-valued observables.
In the Vermaas–Dieks (V-D) [16] version the actual-valued observables are defined by the
spectral resolution of the system’s reduced state, obtained by partial tracing. Even though
these proposals are well suited to describe ideal measurements they failed to describe im-
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perfect measurements. In fact, they do not select the right properties for the apparatus in
the imperfect case (see Albert and Loewer [17]).
Castagnino and Lombardi have observed that the Hamiltonian of the quantum system
plays a decisive role in the property-assignment rule that selects the observables whose possi-
ble values become actual. Once H is given, it is assumed that the actual-valued observables
of the system S are H and all the observables commuting with H and having, at least, the
same symmetries as H . This is the Modal Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI). Independently
of the particular implementation of the Modal Interpretation adopted one can consider that
each time a property is instantiated in a system an event occurs.
As Lombardi and Dieks observe in [18]: “In modal interpretations the event space on
which the (preferred) probability measure is defined is a space of possible events, among
which only one becomes actual. The fact that the actual event is not singled out by these
interpretations is what makes them fundamentally probabilistic. This aspect distinguishes
modal interpretations from many-worlds interpretations, where the “probability measure”
is defined on a space of events that are all actual. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
all modal interpretations agree about the interpretation of probability.” We share the MHI
point of view that adopt a possibilist conception, according to which possible events possibilia
constitute a basic ontological category (see Menzel [19]). The probability measure is in this
case seen as a representation of an ontological propensity of a possible quantum event to
become actual [20]. The Modal Interpretation does not assume that the state changes after
a property instantiates and it assumes that the evolution is always unitary. Nevertheless it
is assumed implicitly that after the observation of a property the disposition of the system
in its subsequent evolution is the same as the one the system would have had if the state
had collapsed. Therefore, the ontology of states and events appear to be well suited to this
interpretation. However, here the relevant kind of events corresponds to instantiations of
properties both of macroscopic and microscopic systems and therefore they do not necessarily
correspond to phenomena.
We have already expressed some reservations about the Many Worlds ontology. In the
case of Modal Interpretations, we also have reservations which are related again with some
implicit approximations. In this case with the notion of “elemental quantum system”, that
introduces an ambiguity in the definition of the “actual valued observables”. In fact, in order
to have a well defined Hamiltonian one needs to assume that S is an “elemental quantum
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system”, that is a system which is in tensor product with the rest of the Universe. Strictly
speaking, only the whole Universe may be considered as an elemental quantum system, that
is a system that do not interact with its environment, and therefore the MHI is again -as
the Many Worlds Interpretation, based in an idealization. In this case the idealization of an
isolated system.
C. Events in the Montevideo Interpretation of quantum mechanics
The closest we have to an explanation for the measurement process within the quantum
theory is environmental decoherence. It is based on the fact that when a quantum system
interacts with an environment with an enormous number of (microscopic) degrees of freedom,
the state of the quantum system suffers transitions that almost look like the abrupt evolutions
one needs to postulate in measurements. However, even if they are difficult to detect,
quantum superpositions are still there and may be in principle observed.
Environmental decoherence is important because the measurement processes involve in-
teractions with macroscopic systems with many degrees of freedom. Interactions with the
environment were neglected for decades and the relevance of this effect was only recognized
in the 1980’s
A new interpretation was recently proposed. The novelty of this interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics is the inclusion in the quantum description of another factor up to now
neglected. In the standard Schro¨dinger description of the evolution, time is treated as a
classical external parameter, but time is actually measured by physical clocks that obey
quantum mechanical laws. Quantum measurements of time have a limited precision. This
limitation arises from quantum fluctuations and gravitational time delay and has a fun-
damental nature [21]. This effect, first noticed more than 50 years ago has been recently
confirmed by many authors. We have shown that a quantum mechanical treatment of time
[22] combined with fundamental limitations of measurements stemming from general rela-
tivity, lead to a modified Schro¨dinger evolution that allows transitions between quantum
superpositions and statistical mixtures.
When one takes into account the limitations in measurement imposed by quantum me-
chanics and gravity, the states resulting from decoherence are indistinguishable from those
produced by the measurement postulate. The “almost” of the standard approach to de-
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coherence is removed by fundamental limitations predicted by the theory itself and the
transitions from superpositions to statistical mixtures required to explain measurements are
deduced. This in turn supplies an objective criterion that says when and what events may
occur. Events occur when the state of a system resulting from a full quantum mechanical
evolution becomes a statistical mixture [7, 23]. The transition of the state of the system
plus environment to a statistical mixture gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of events. Events are assumed to occur as random choices of the system. They
simultaneously lead to the production of events and the state reduction. It is not assumed
in this interpretation that these choices are part of a process that the theory describe as it is
the case of the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber approach. It is an additional postulate that however
needs no reference to a classical world or a notion of measurement.
The modified evolution induced by the use of a quantum time leads for a quantum
system coupled with its environment to a state that is a statistical mixture. This provides
an objective criterion for the occurrence of events and state reductions that establishes
when events and changes in the state may occur without disrupting the prediction of the
evolution equation. It is important to remark that within this interpretation events always
occur in systems that include a macroscopic environment and therefore are macroscopic as
the phenomena considered by Omne`s. In this sense this interpretation keeps more similarities
with the Many Worlds Interpretation than with the Modal ones.
Up to now one only has a precise analysis of the complete process leading to the statistical
mixture for spinning particles. For other systems one can prove that the state of the mi-
crosystem coupled to the environment approaches exponentially to the statistical mixture.
We consider that this is enough to assume the indistinguishability. Given the fact that the
distinction between an evolution that includes quantum time measurements or a quantum
reduction would require an exponentially growing number of individual measurements in
order to have the required statistics for distinguishing a non vanishing exponentially small
mean value from zero. Limitations referring to the existence of a finite number of physical
resources in a finite observable Universe would be enough to ensure undecidability. [23, 24]
However, this is a point that needs further study to have a definite answer.
Summarizing, for all the interpretations that admit an event ontology and for quantum
systems interacting with a macroscopic environment that has many degrees of freedom,
events will be plentiful. They not only occur on measuring devices, they occur around us all
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the time. Measurements are nothing but the assignment of quantitative properties to events
occurring in measuring devices.
IV. EMERGENCE IN TERMS OF AN EVENT ONTOLOGY
Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena,
while at the same time exerting a “top-down” control, constraint, or some other sort of
influence upon those very sustaining processes. We are interested in strong emergence, its
defining characteristics are qualitative novelty and ontological non-reducibility. The notion
of emergence we are proposing considers emergent entities to be genuinely novel features of
the world. By definition, one talks here of causal powers that cannot be explained in terms
of the micro causal powers but arise from the existence of certain macro level entities.
Strong emergence seems to be particularly relevant: if someone attempts to explain
natural phenomena without denying the existence of mental processes in physical terms she
must demonstrate the viability of emergence with downward causation. The central point
which this concept refers to is that higher level mental events have the ability to influence
the behavior of more basic levels. This requires philosophical compromises that are not easy
to justify in terms of an ontology based on classical physics. In fact attempts of explanation
within a mechanistic view are problematic.
There have been attempts Sperry [25] to supplement classical mechanics with “config-
urational forces” to account for strong emergence and downward causation. McLaughlin
[26], explains this concept as follows, “Consider the doctrine that there are fundamental
powers to influence motion associated with types of structures of particles that compose
certain chemical, biological, and psychological kinds. Let us see what this would imply in
the framework of classical mechanics, for example. It would imply that types of structures
that compose certain special science kinds can affect the acceleration of a particle in ways
unanticipated by laws concerning forces exerted by pairs of particles, general laws of motion,
and the spatial or spatio-temporal arrangements of particles. In a framework of forces, the
view implies that there are what we may call configurational forces: fundamental forces that
can be exerted only by certain types of configurations of particles, and not by any types of
forces between pairs of particles as the usual interacting forces of the fundamental systems
as the one exerted by charged particles.”
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Let us examine these proposals in some detail. For that we need to briefly discuss how
systems of particles are described in classical physics. In three dimensional space one needs
three numbers in order to characterize the position of a particle: its coordinates. One
also needs three numbers to characterize its velocity (one for its magnitude and two for its
orientation). Therefore six numbers tell us all we need to know about the particle from a
mechanical perspective. With such information any property of the classical particle can be
determined and also its future behavior. If one has N particles one needs 6N numbers. Such
numbers can be thought of as belonging in an abstract 6N dimensional mathematical space
called phase space. The evolution in time of a system of particles in such a space is a curve in
phase space. Any property of the complete system at a given instant is determined by those
6N numbers. A way of introducing configurational forces is considering a certain region of
phase space. The force acts if the point representing the state of the system at a given
instant of time lies within that region. Could such a force account for downward causation?
Notice that by referring to a region of phase space, the force is therefore dependent on the
positions and velocities of all particles and not on pairs of particles as are all the other
fundamental forces of physics. Such a force is not a combination of ordinary Newtonian
forces nor results from the action of gravity or electromagnetism. Obviously from the point
of view of ordinary physics the introduction of such kind of forces, which depend on each
system, is highly artificial. And since they are not reducible to elementary forces one would
need a new ad-hoc force for each type of emergent system. This would therefore preclude
any scientific explanation of phenomena. This should require a kind of “intelligent design”
for any emergent system from a molecule to a living being incompatible with any scientific
explanation. Attempts to understand emergence from classical physics are destined to fail
and have led those that followed this path to believe, like Bedau does [27] that “strong
emergence starts when scientific explanation ends.”
We will show that certain quantum mechanical systems present precisely this kind of
top-down control. It is well known that in quantum theory the physical state of a system
of particles cannot always be reduced to the state of its component particles, “or to those
[states] of its parts together with their spatiotemporal relations, even when the parts inhabit
distinct regions of space.” as noted by Maudlin [28]. We want to emphasize here that this
quantum mechanical holism involves systems that have ontologically new properties and
present downward causation where macro-systems have effects on their micro components
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[29]. That is, the basic tenet of strong emergentism is that at a certain level of physical
complexity novel properties appear that do not result from the properties of the parts of
the system or their relations and that contribute causally to the world. That is, emergent
properties have new downward causal powers that are irreducible to the causal powers of
the properties of their underlying base. Ontological emergentism is therefore typically com-
mitted to downward causation, that is, causation from macroscopic levels to microscopic
levels. If we adopt Crane’s [30] terminology our position should be considered as non reduc-
tive physicalism because it denies ontological reduction but admits explanatory reduction
in the sense that the upper level properties and causal powers can be explained in quantum
mechanical terms.
The traditional objections to emergence result from the explicit or implicit use of ontolog-
ical concepts based on classical physics and are not tenable when assessed from a quantum
mechanical ontology of events.
A. Ontologically new properties
Let us start by showing that quantum systems may have ontologically new properties.
Quantum systems may have certain quantum states, called entangled, that have well defined
properties that neither follow from the properties of parts, nor from relations among them.
To understand this statement better, let us review how entangled states are defined and
contrast them with systems in classical states.
In classical physics the state of a system of particles (~r1, ~v1, . . . , ~rN , ~vN) is simply the union
of the states of each particle. Its knowledge determine all the properties of the system.
For instance the energy E(~r1, ~v1, . . . , ~rN , ~vN). All the properties of a classical system are
functions of the properties of its components.
In quantum mechanics things are very different. Most of the properties of a system do not
have well defined values until measured; for instance the position of an electron is not well
defined until a dot is produced in the photographic plate and it is detected. However any
quantum system in a pure state has some well defined properties. For instance, a spinning
particle can take two possible values of its component along an axis zˆ: up or down. When one
performs repeated measurements on particles on a given state one observes dots appearing in
the upper region with certain probability an in the lower with the complementary probability.
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When the electron is in a state that leads with certainty to a dot in the upper region of the
detector identified by z > 0, one may say that it is in the state |z, up〉. In this case one may
assign the property “ z up” to the state This is the only property that one can assign to this
state. The measurement of any other component will not lead to a unique value: i.e. always
up or always down. In general, the properties of a pure state |ψ > is always associated
with a set of projectors P1...PN such that Pi|ψ >= |ψ >. It is only when one knows with
certainty what will be the behavior of the system in certain state that one may assign it a
property. In fact, as we have observed before, events have many well defined properties but
typically states do not have properties until they produce events. One may assign properties
to states only indirectly trough the properties observed in some events produced during the
preparation process of the state.
Systems composed of several particles may also have states with some properties with
well-defined values. However, these properties may refer to the system as a whole and, in
these systems, there may not be any property for the states of individual particles with well-
defined values. These composite systems are called entangled. More in general, entangled
systems are those that have properties with well defined values than cannot be inferred from
those of their constituent parts. As we will see in what follows, it might even be the case
that the constituent parts have no well defined properties and yet the system as a whole
does.
Consider two electrons with spin in the z direction in a state
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
|1, z, up〉|2, z, down〉+ 1√
2
|1, z, down〉|2, z, up〉. (1)
Neither the state of particle 1 nor the one of particle 2 have well defined properties. No
matter what component of the spin of one of the particles one measures, one has a probability
1/2 of measuring up and 1/2 of obtaining down. Even though each entangled electron do not
have well defined properties for their spin components the total system does. For instance
one can show that it has total spin s = 1 in Planck units , and z component of the total spin
sz = 0. It is only when the observations made on particle 1 and 2 are compared that one
can discover the properties of the total system. One could also determine these properties
when the complete system is measured. The constituents therefore now form an inseparable
unit endowed with properties without the individual systems having any property —any
spin component— with well defined value.
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This holistic behavior is actually not an exception but is the generic behavior of two
quantum systems after an interaction. For instance, the precise vibrational modes of a
molecule depend on the entangled system of electrons and nuclei. Underlying this feature
is the exponential growth of states with the number of component particles in quantum
mechanics in contraposition with the linear growth in classical physics. Most of these states
and their corresponding properties —projectors— would have never occurred in systems
with independent —non entangled— components.
Ontological novelty manifests itself in the emergence of new properties that do not result
from properties of the parts. They arise only when the composite structure is constituted.
The emergent properties of such systems are crucial for explaining chemical or biological
properties in physical terms. For instance: the magnetic counterpart of the properties of
entangled spins work as a magnetic needle that is at the basis of navigational skills of the
European robin, a migratory bird able to detect the direction and strength of the Earth
magnetic field. A “sixth” sense known as magnetoreception [31].
The philosopher of science Paul Teller [2] was the first in noticing that quantum phe-
nomena show relations that do not stem from non-relational properties of their relata, as
is characteristic of the classical description of the world. Entangled systems present what
Teller calls: relational holism [32]. The emergence of new properties of the whole in a quan-
tum world where events and properties play a fundamental role is a crucial manifestation of
ontological novelty. This conclusion follows provided one adopts a realist ontology.
Healey [33] has introduced the notion of Physical Property Holism that assumes that there
are physical objects “not all of whose qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations
supervene on qualitative intrinsic physical properties and relations in the supervenience basis
of their basic physical parts.” He observed that the existence of physical property holism
in entangled systems depends on the interpretation of quantum mechanics that one adopts.
Our discussion was restricted to the ontology of events and it is in this context that have
proved that ontologically new properties arise.
B. Downward causation
A strong form of emergence also requires downward causation, namely, the emergence of
novel causal powers. Here a double goal arises: to characterize such form of causality in
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physical terms and to show that at least certain systems, like the quantum ones, exhibit
downward causation.
A notion of causality that is suitable to the ontology of states and events has been
developed by Chakravartty [34]. He founds his notion on what he calls ”causal properties”.
As we have associated the notion of property to projectors in the Hilbert space we prefer
to speak about causal powers. Following Chakravartty we will recognize a causal power
for its capacity to confer dispositions on the objects that have them to behave in certain
ways when in the presence or absence of other objects with causal powers of their own. This
dispositional idea of causality —originally due to Heisenberg— is the one we have adopted in
our work for states: recall that quantum states characterizes dispositions to produce events
in their interaction with other systems.
Causality is normally presented in terms of related events. In quantum mechanics this
vision is incomplete if the concept of state is not included. Indeed, among the events that
prepare a state and the ones observed usually there is a period of time and the disposition
to produce events is not given just by the initial preparation. It is indeed given by the
state. The latter is defined in terms of initially observed events and their time evolution.
Changes in the state are determined by its Hamiltonian evolution. Only the state at a
time t defines completely the causes that lead to the observation of events in t. Quantum
mechanics introduces a probabilistic notion of causation that involves states as causes and
events as effects.
An object will present downward causation if the parts have some behaviors that are
dictated by the state of the whole and that cannot be predicted from the knowledge of the
state of the parts. The previous example of an entangled state shows that in quantum me-
chanics there is state non-separability [33]. In the example of entangled spinning particles
the states of the parts are represented by reduced density matrices and they are just a sta-
tistical mixture of “up” components and “down” components while the complete entangled
state has more information, in particular information about correlation between the events
observed in each component. For instance the spin measurements of both particles will be
correlated. Whenever both observers measure the spin in the same direction their results
would be opposite, —up for Alice and down for Bob or vice versa—. The observers could
never have figured out these correlations by looking at the individual systems in isolation
without comparing their measurements. The complete system has certain non locality such
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that when one electron chose to answer up, the other necessarily needs to chose down. Such
correlation does not involve time. As it is well known Bell’s theorem establishes that it is not
possible to explain this kind of behavior assuming that each part follows a pre-established set
of instructions, in other words, assuming that each part has some local hidden information
telling it how to act before each measurement. In other terms the state of the entangled
pair of particles given for instance by |s = 1, sz = 0〉 is not mathematically determined by
the the states of the parts. In fact there are two states |s = 1, sz = 0〉 and |s = 0, sz = 0〉
whose parts are in identical states.
These correlation are generic for any entangled state. Any system in an entangled state
presents downward causation. The events produced by different components of the system
have correlations that do not result from the states of the parts. In fact, the very char-
acterization of the entanglement of a pure state in terms of the Von Neumann entropy or
entanglement entropy that is always a positive quantity shows that the complete informa-
tion required for the determination of the whole cannot be recovered from the information
of the parts or that the state of the whole cannot be mathematically expressed in terms of
the states of its parts. The states’ roles in causation, together with their non-separability
when they are entangled, imply downward causation.
Less trivial explicit examples of downward causation may be found in the molecular
behavior where entanglement cannot be ignored or in quantum computers. In quantum
chemistry calculations, entanglement is related with the correlation energy. This energy is
neglected in Hartree–Fock calculations and the energy error of the Hartree–Fock approxi-
mation to the wavefunctions of a molecular system is a measure of the effects of downward
causation in the behavior of the molecular components. In fact, the Hartre-Fock approxima-
tion consists in writing the state of the electronic system as a tensor product of one particle
states. The approximation to the exact energy would be worse when the system becomes
more entangled. For instance, it is downward causation of the whole molecular system state
that determines the precise vibrational behavior of the nuclei.
For quantum computers, the existence of quantum correlations in the entangled states
between different input and output outcomes is at the basis of the application of quantum
algorithm that allow to solve certain problems like integer factorization using Shor’s algo-
rithm much more quickly than any classical computers. The disposition of the quantum
computer to produce the correct correlation between the input and output results at the
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end of the computation is the manifestation of the quantum downward causation that is at
the basis of the improvement of the computational capabilities of quantum computer.
We have characterized the downward causation of a system by its disposition to produce
certain effects that is not present in the dispositions of its parts. This kind of disposition is
the characteristic feature of systems in entangled states. In turn, the existence of entangled
states in quantum systems result from the exponential growth of Hilbert spaces of composed
systems in opposition to the linear growth of the states in classical physics. At the basis
of the novelty and non-reducibility of emergent systems it is this exponential growth in
the possible behaviors of the quantum systems whose philosophical implications can be
recognized when the appropriate ontology is put into action. Summarizing, emergence is
not the exception but the rule in interacting quantum systems, its so natural that it usually
remains unnoticed. Strong emergence manifest itself in most complex systems, it is a natural
result of the interaction of quantum objects.
The recent advances in the understanding of the role of quantum mechanics in biology [35]
and the previous analysis of strong emergence in quantum mechanics rise the expectations
of understanding mental phenomena and their causal powers in physical terms. The issue
of emergence, also known as non reductive physicalism in the context of studies of the mind
brain problem, has been extensively analyzed mostly using notions of supervenience that
assume some form of separability and are not valid in quantum mechanics as shown by
Maudlin [1]. We consider that in quantum entangled systems with downward causation and
dispositional states that leads to probabilistic outcomes the issue of free will may be posed
in a clear explicit way and will be analyzed elsewhere.
V. SUMMARY
Several interpretations of quantum mechanics admit event ontologies. These realistic
interpretations lead to an important revision of the notion of matter and its potentialities.
Systems of particles in entangled states have new behaviors and emergent properties.
The quantum theory implies that the lower levels are modified even up to the point
where they lose part of their individuality when they integrate into an entangled system in
a higher level of the hierarchy. The emergent structure has novel properties and downward
causation. Interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit an event ontology solve the
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traditional problem of explaining emergence.
This work was supported in part by grant NSF-PHY-1305000, NSF-PHY-1603063, ANII
FCE-1-2014-1-103974, funds of the Hearne Institute for Theoretical Physics, CCT-LSU and
Pedeciba.
[1] T. Maudlin, “The metaphysics within physics”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007).
[2] P. Teller, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 37, 71 (1986).
[3] P. Busch, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 33B, 517-539 (2002) [arXiv:quant-ph/0010115].
[4] J. Faye, “Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/qm-copenhagen.
[5] B. Russell “The analysis of matter”, Spokesman books, Nottingham, UK (2007).
[6] R. Omne´s “The interpretation of quantum mechanics”, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ p. 98 (1994).
[7] R. Gambini, L. P. Garcia-Pintos and J. Pullin, Stud. Hist. Philos. Mod. Phys. 42, 256 (2011)
doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.10.002 [arXiv:1002.4209 [quant-ph]].
[8] A. N. Whitehead “Science and the modern world” Free Press, New York (1925/1997).
[9] R. Gambini and R. A. Porto, Phys. Rev. D 63, 105014 (2001)
doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.63.105014 [gr-qc/0101057].
[10] B. Russell, “The analysis of mind” CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform (2013).
[11] D. Chalmers “The First-Person and Third- Person Views (Part I)”,
http://consc.net/notes/first-third.html
[12] H. Everett, III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957).
[13] S. Saunders in S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent and D. Wallace, “Many Worlds?: Everett,
Quantum Theory, and Reality” , Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2010).
[14] B. van Fraassen “The scientific image”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (1980).
[15] S. Kochen, “A new interpretation of quantum mechanics”, in “Symposium on the Foundations
of Modern Physics 1985”, P. Mittelstaedt and P. Lahti (eds.), World Scientific, Singapore
(1985); D. Dieks, “The formalism of quantum theory: an objective description of reality?”,
Annalen der Physik, 7, 174 (1998)
22
[16] D. Dieks, P. Vermaas (eds.) “The Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, Dordrecht (1998).
[17] D. Albert, B. Loewer “Wanted dead or alive: Two attempts to solve Schro¨dinger’s paradox.”
Proceedings of the 1990 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1.
East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 277-285 (1990); Found. Phys.Lett. 6, 297-305
(1993).
[18] O. Lombardi D. Dieks, “Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics”, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/qm-modal/.
[19] C. Menzel “Actualism”. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2007 Edition), URL = ¡http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/actualism/¿.
[20] O. Lombardi, M. Castagnino, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. Part B 39 (2):380-443 (2008)
[21] H. Salecker, E. P. Wigner Phys. Rev. 109, 571 (1958); F. Ka´rolhya´zy, A. Frenkel, B. Luka´cs, B.
“Gravity in the reduction of the wavefunction”, in R. Penrose and C. Isham, (eds.), Quantum
concepts in space and time. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1986); Y. Ng, H. van Dam Ann.
N. Y. Acad. Sci. 755, 579 (1995).
[22] R. Gambini, R. A. Porto, J. Pullin and S. Torterolo, Phys. Rev. D 79, 041501 (2009)
doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.79.041501 [arXiv:0809.4235 [gr-qc]].
[23] R. Gambini and J. Pullin, arXiv:1502.03410 [quant-ph].
[24] J. Butterfield, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. A 52, 75 (2015). [arXiv:1406.4351 [physics.hist-ph]]
[25] R. Sperry, J. of Mind and Behav. 8, 37-66 (1987).
[26] B. McLaughlin “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism” in A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, J.
Kim (eds.) “Emergence or Reduction?” Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, Germny (1992).
[27] M. Bedau, Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 6(1), 5-50 (2002).
[28] T. Maudlin, “Parts and whole in quantum mechanics” in E. Castellani (ed.) “Interpreting
bodies”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1998).
[29] R. Gambini, L. Lewowicz, J. Pullin Found. Chem. 17 pp 117-127 (2015).
[30] T. Crane, “Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap” in
“Emergence in Mind”, Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (eds.) Oxford University
Press, New York (2010); “The Significance of Emergence” in B. Loewer and G. Gillett (eds)
“Physicalism and Its Discontents” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2001).
23
[31] J. McFadden, J. Al-Khalili “Life on the edge”, Crown, 2015.
[32] Teller, P. (1986). Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 37, 71-81.
[33] Healey, R. (1999) “Holism and nonseparability in physics” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy http://plato.stanford.edu
[34] A. Chakravartty, “A metaphysics for scientific realism. Knowing the unknowable”, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007.
[35] V. Vedral, “Living in a quantum world” Scientific American, June. (2011)
24
